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This paper uses the newly constructed Luxembourg Wealth Study data to document 
cross-country variation in homeownership rates and the homeownership-income 
inequality among young households in Finland, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US, and 
relate it to cross-country differences in mortgage market maturity. We find that aside 
from Italy, homeownership rates and inequality in the four countries correspond to their 
mortgage take up rates and its distribution across income, reflecting the different degree 
of development of their respective mortgage markets. In Italy, alternative ways of 
financing, such as family transfers, substitute the limited mortgage availability and 
explains the second highest homeownership rate in our sample, despite the lowest 
mortgage take up. The mortgage market in the UK is the most open and the most equal, 
which leads to the highest and most equally distributed homeownership in this country as 
well. The mortgage market in Germany is on the other side of the spectrum with very low 
mortgage take-up rates and strong dependence of homeownership and mortgage take up 
on household income. Finland and the US are in-between. Counterfactual predictions 
suggest that although household characteristics play some role in explaining the variation 
in home ownership rates across the five countries, it is mostly the country specific effects 
of these characteristics determined by the institutional environment as well as the 
functioning of the housing and mortgage markets that drive the main result.  
 
JEL codes: D14, D31, G21, R21 
Key words: home ownership, credit constraints, mortgage market 
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1. Introduction  
One of the more important decisions individuals make during the life-cycle is the 
amount they wish to spend on housing services and whether or not to combine it with 
ownership. Housing is a major component of both consumption and investment.  It 
absorbs a large portion of the household budget and in many countries it is the largest 
item of households’ wealth portfolios.  
This paper uses the newly constructed Luxembourg Wealth Study database to 
document cross-country variation in homeownership rates and the homeownership-income 
inequality in Finland, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US, and relate it to cross-country 
differences in mortgage take-up rates and their distribution across income. As we explore 
the role of mortgage availability in determining the observed variation in homeownership 
rates, we focus our analysis on young households (18 to 40 years of age), who are the most 
likely to depend on access to the mortgage market for financing their home purchases. 
Homeownership among young households in these five countries exhibits wide variation. 
It ranges from 21.4 % of homeowners in Germany to 63.9 % in the UK, with Finland (43.3 
%), the US (47.9 %) and Italy (50.9 %) in between. In terms of mortgage financing, the 
UK has the highest mortgage rate (62 %), followed by the US (43 %) and Finland (39 %). 
Germany (19 %) and Italy (16 %) have much lower mortgage incidence than the other 
countries under analysis, and are similar in this respect, which sharply contrasts with the 
low homeownership rate in the first and high homeownership rate in the latter. 
Based on our analysis, we find that the mortgage market in the UK is the most open 
(in terms of mortgage take up) and the most equal (in terms of the distribution of both 
homeownership and mortgage take-up across household income deciles). The mortgage 
market in Germany is on the other side of the spectrum, with very low mortgage take-up 
rates and strong dependence of homeownership and mortgage take up on household   4
income (high homeownership/mortgage income inequality). Finland and the US are in 
between - both in terms of homeownership and mortgage take up inequality - with the 
Finnish mortgage market and homeownership distribution somewhat more equal than in 
the US. While it is possible that it is the high financial development of the mortgage 
market that ensures high homeownership rates and wide mortgage availability in the US, it 
is also the relatively small housing prices that lead to a similar result for Finland. The 
ranking of the four countries according to homeownership rates and inequality more or less 
correspond to their mortgage take up rates and its distribution across income, reflecting the 
different degrees of development of the markets for housing debt.   
The only country that does not fit the rankings is Italy. While it has a low use of 
mortgages, similar to Germany, homeownership there is almost as high and equal across 
income as in the UK. The data and qualitative evidence suggest that it is the alternative 
sources of home ownership funding, namely transfers (and possibly loans) from family 
(and friends) that substitute the highly underdeveloped mortgage market in Italy. 
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the economic background of 
our analysis and survey related previous research. We then describe the data, sample 
characteristics and our methodology. This is followed by a comparison of housing and 
mortgage market characteristics and institutions. The results section first documents 
country-specific homeownership and mortgage take up rates and their distribution across 
income, using simple summary measures and a full probability model of home owning 
and having a mortgage. We then decompose the cross-country variation in 
homeownership rates and mortgage take up rates driven by the differences in household 
characteristics and by the differences in country specific housing and mortgage market 
regimes (coefficients). A section discussing possible policy implications of our main 
results follows the conclusions.   5
2. Economics of Homeownership  
The standard economic theory suggests that what really matters for the current well 
being (consumption or leisure) of the forward-looking utility maximizing household, is the 
present value of the sum of the current household wealth and the expected lifetime income. 
With perfect financial markets, where individuals can borrow against their future earnings, 
the distribution of the current consumption (and asset holdings) reflects the “overall” 
economic inequality in a population, as given by the present value of lifetime resources. 
This is not the case when there are liquidity constraints: two households that are at the 
beginning of their career and have the same expected lifetime resources - one with higher 
initial assets but a flatter labor income profile, the other with lower initial assets but higher 
expected future earnings - are no longer economically equal when measured by current 
consumption or asset holdings. In this paper, we explore to what extent access to credit 
markets helps explain homeownership inequality among young households.  
In many countries, homeownership is identified as the preferred form of living 
arrangement and receives preferential treatment over renting, for example, in the tax code.  
However, homeownership does not necessarily have to be preferable to renting. Individuals 
may prefer not to carry the risks and costs related to owning their homes. Owning one’s 
home may also decrease mobility and migration, and limit employment opportunities. On 
the other hand, homeownership is the principal means by which households accumulate 
wealth, at the same time providing a flow of services.  As a major private asset, housing 
may also serve as source of financial security and income during retirement. When 
compared to other forms of housing, homeownership seems to bring higher housing 
satisfaction across individuals in several European countries (Diaz-Serrano 2006). It is also 
considered an important signal of social status and economic success (Constant, Roberts 
and Zimmermann, 2007). Unless households have accumulated enough savings or have   6
access to informal loans, the ability to purchase homes is determined by access to formal 
credit, in this case, mortgage availability.  
The cross-country variation in homeownership may reflect country-specific 
personal preferences (possibly affected by cultural and historic traditions) for owning a 
house, for investment in equity or for mobility. The decision whether to own a home and 
when, is often related to the decision about marriage and child bearing. As the 
characteristics of the young differ across countries - in terms of demographic and human 
capital characteristics (such as family structure and schooling) – the household formation 
and therefore the need for one’s own home vary as well. There are also cross-country 
differences in economic characteristics of the young households (such as distribution of 
income and wealth). Relative cost of home-owning and renting also varies substantially 
across countries, which is another factor that affects the decision to own one’s home. 
Finally, the observed variation may be driven by the differences in access to funds, namely, 
the access to credit: other things being equal, we would expect in countries with less 
developed credit markets and lower mortgage availability, lower homeownership rates, 
strong homeownership dependence on income and high homeownership-income inequality 
among the young.  
Our analysis does not make any explicit assumptions about which of the factors 
dominate. From the most conservative point of view, we document the homeownership 
and mortgage take up rates and their distribution across income, regardless whether the 
observed patterns reflect preferences or constraints. Although we proxy some of the 
factors mentioned above, which drive the demand for home ownership, with observable 
household characteristics, and carry the estimation separately by each country, we are not 
able to control for any unobserved attitudes towards homeownership that vary with   7
income.  We also survey the cross-country differences in institutions affecting housing 
and mortgage markets and discuss them in the light of our findings in a separate section. 
When interpreting our results we treat homeownership as the preferred housing 
arrangement, and consider the non-home-owning households as credit constrained. This 
assumption allows us to interpret the cross-country differences in homeownership-
income inequality as driven by the cross-country differences in the access to funds, 
namely mortgage finance. We discuss the validity of this assumption when surveying the 
country-specific housing market characteristics and institutions, in particular the existing 
alternatives to home-owning.   
3. Previous Research 
Past literature on the demographics of homeownership has conventionally identified three 
main factors affecting tenure choice: permanent income, the cost of owning relative to 
renting, and household characteristics. In recent literature credit access has been brought 
to the forefront as one of the key determinants of homeownership. Chiuri and Jappelli 
(2003) is one of the first attempts to account for age differences in homeownership across 
countries as a result of cross-country variation in access to credit. The paper concludes 
that the availability of mortgage finance, as measured by down payment ratios, mortgage 
equity withdrawal or reverse mortgages, affects the distribution of owner occupancy rates 
across age groups including the young. Unlike our study, their analysis lacks micro-data 
on mortgage take-up rates, and therefore, down payment ratios are used as indicators of 
mortgage availability. The paper finds that in countries with developed mortgage markets 
the home ownership profile is significantly tilted towards the young. In single country 
studies, such as Ortalo-Magne and Rady 1999, access to mortgage credit is also found to 
be crucial to increase in homeownership in the UK in the 1980s. Equally, when Chiuri 
and Jappelli (2007) study homeownership trajectories for old age groups, they find that   8
across countries these are highly correlated with the degree of mortgage market 
regulation. 
A number of studies have also examined homeownership by race and by family 
types. Here again, the main barriers that stand out in purchasing a home are wealth, 
income and credit constraints (Bostic, Calem and Wachter 2004).  Quercia, McCarthy 
and Wachter (2003) identify that in the US populations associated with such constraints 
are those with lower incomes, city residents and the young.  Sedo and Kossoudji (2004) 
examine homeownership by family types in the US and find that increases in income are 
more important to homeownership at lower income levels than at high income levels for 
each family type.  Age, like income also exhibits a concave shape in all family types. 
Overall, they find that the impact of householder’s characteristics on the probability of 
owning a home is similar for all the householders, regardless of gender and family type. 
When doing counterfactual predictions they find that each householder regardless of race 
and sex have the highest predicted probabilities of home ownership if they were to have 
coefficients form a married couple household. Marriage appears to be powerful enough to 
stimulate demand for housing and alter mortgage lenders decisions, or change behavior in 
a way that is more compatible with home ownership.  
This also indicates that the most important aspect of the homeownership gap that 
exists across gender and family type is family type itself. It is not clear whether behavior 
on the part of the household or behavior on the part of mortgage lenders (or both) is the 
culprit. Combine this with limited credit availability and credit market development 
across countries and we find that the highest homeownership among young couples is the 
most prevalent in countries where there is the highest rate of married couples among the 
young or credit markets are very well developed.    9
Bostic and Surette (2001) find that in the 1990s differences in homeownership 
between minority and non-minority families and between middle-income and lower-
income families declined significantly. Additionally, changes in family-related 
characteristics explain homeownership trends only among the top two income quintiles.  
Their results suggest that favorable changes in mortgage and housing markets and 
changes in the regulations that govern those markets and have facilitated credit access 
help explain the increase in homeownership among lower-income families. 
Di and Liu (2005), on the other hand, examine the importance of wealth and income on 
homeownership over time in the US and their effect on different racial groups. Their 
findings suggest that the proliferation of mortgage products that allowed for low down 
payments in the late 1990s may have contributed to a reduction in the importance of 
wealth for achieving homeownership and they do not find a reduction in the importance 
of income, despite the fact that allowable ratios of debt-to-income have increased. Other 
studies have consistently found that wealth and to a lesser extent credit constraints are 
more important than income constraints in limiting access to homeownership (eg. 
Barakova, Bostic, Calem, and Wachter 2003); others also point to the cost of owning 
relative to renting as a significant determinant (Haurin, Hendershott and Wachter 1997). 
Another issue encountered in the literature on homeownership is the fact that 
there exists differential household formation across countries. Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) 
outline the problem of the Italian and Spanish young adults that tend to live with their 
parents well beyond the age of 25, due to higher unemployment and greater difficulty of 
having independent living arrangements. Martins and Villanueva (2006) examine 
whether differences in household structure can be traced back to restricted credit access 
for the young and find that access to a mortgage loan increases the probability that a 
young adult creates her/his household by between 31 and 54 percentage points in   10
                                                
Portugal. A similar argument may also possibly explain the relatively older age of young 
households in Italy. Combining their estimates with cross-country data, they establish 
that differences in the availability of credit can explain up to 20% of the cross-European 
variance of nest leaving.   
4. Data and Descriptive Characteristics  
To analyze the impact of credit market development and mortgage availability on 
the differences between the distributions of homeownership across income we use the 
Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS). This is a new project within the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS).
1 The LWS database contains harmonized wealth and income data from ten 
industrialized countries. The primary goal of the project has been to assemble and to 
organize existing micro-data on household wealth into a coherent database, in order to 
provide a sounder basis for comparative studies on household net worth, portfolio 
composition, and wealth distributions. It is the first cross-country comparable dataset, 
which includes information about households’ assets and liabilities, necessary to identify 
homeownership and mortgage take-up, as well as expenditures and income and a range of 
other demographic and economic characteristics of the households. For more details see 
Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding (2006a, 2006b) and consult the LIS website. 
Detailed information about different types of debt (home-secured, non-home-secured, 
informal debt) also allows us to identify the cross-country differences in the role of 
informal credit, and to what extent this provides a substitute to the official credit, when 
credit markets are underdeveloped.  
 
1 LIS is a cross-national archive of harmonized datasets from the industrialized countries, which include 
income data at the household- and person-level, as well as extensive demographic and labor market data. 
Currently, the LIS database includes over 160 datasets from approximately thirty countries, covering the 
period 1967 to 2004. More information is available on the LIS website (http://www.lisproject.org). 
   11
                                                
In this paper, we include five countries from the period of 1998-2002. These 
countries include two Anglophone countries, the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK); two continental European countries, Italy and Germany; and one Nordic 
country Finland. These countries have diverse economic outcomes and varying housing 
and mortgage systems.
2  In all countries considered the data period of analysis falls 
during a time of positive house price growth, particularly in Finland, Italy, the UK and 
the US (Consult Appendix Figures A.2-A.6 for details). In Germany the change in house 
prices has been more moderate and not as strikingly positive. 
 Sample and Sample Selection 
We select households, where the head and spouse are between 18 and 40 years 
old and are not students. We exclude extremely rich individuals that are defined as 
having financial assets greater then the 95
th percentile of the distribution of financial 
assets. 
  The sample data for the US and Germany has undergone multiple imputation 
and consists of 5 replicates of the original data. Consequently, since the five implicates 
would be treated as independent observations and correspondingly inflate the reported 
significance of results
3 we have corrected the standard errors for multiple imputation.  
Sample Descriptives 
Table 1 shows the differences in homeownership in our sample of young 
households, ranging from 21.4 % of homeowners in Germany to 63.9 % of homeowners in 
the UK, with Finland (43.3 %), the US (47.9 %) and Italy (50.9 %) in between. In terms of 
mortgage financing, the UK has the highest mortgage rate (62 %), followed by the US (43 
 
2 The original datasets that the LWS project harmonized, and that are included in this study, are: for the 
United States, the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF); for the United Kingdom, the 2000 British 
Household Panel Study (BHPS); for Italy, the 2002 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW); for 
Germany, the 2002 Socio-Economic Panel Study (German SOEP); and for Finland, the 1998 Wealth 
Survey.  
3 The imputation procedure is described in Kennickell (1998).    12
                                                
%) and Finland (39 %). Germany (19 %) and Italy (16 %) have much lower mortgage 
incidence than the other countries under analysis, and are similar in this respect, which 
sharply contrasts with the low homeownership rate in the first and high homeownership 
rate in the latter. Comparing the homeownership and mortgage take-up rates, we see that 
homeownership in four of the countries is mostly driven by housing loans. In Italy, home 
purchases by young households are much less mortgage dependent, which suggests that 
there exist alternative ways of obtaining homes other than mortgage and these compensate 
for the low mortgage availability. Past studies, have indicated that strong, intergenerational 
transfers (homes passed down from generation to generation or new homes bought for the 
young by their parents) provide a substitute for the limited supply of housing loans, with 
the result of homeownership rate among young households being comparable to those in 
countries with highly developed mortgage markets. 
4 (We also find this relationship for the 
whole population. See Appendix Table A.1) 
Table 2 compares the country-specific datasets of young heads of household in 
terms of the key variables used in the analysis. The first set of factors that we assume to 
have an effect on homeownership, are demographic characteristics of the household. 
Young household heads are substantially older in Italy, and also somewhat older in the 
UK and Germany, when compared to the US and Finland. Besides the different 
demographic structure of the various populations, this may also reflect the propensity and 
timing of young individuals to leave home and form their own household. Such a 
decision is likely to be influenced by the situation on the labor market, housing market 
and also access to credit (Martins and Villaneuva 2006). In Appendix Figure A.1 we find 
 
4 In Italy, for instance, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) find that inter vivos transfers and bequests play a 
considerable role in home purchases, particularly in the case where there are credit market imperfections. 
Haliassos et al (2006) also find this strong cultural effect for Cyprus.   13
the distribution of households across ages. The probability of forming a household varies 
a great deal across countries for the young and then for the older individuals. 
In Italy individuals form households at a similar level as their counterparts in 
other countries in their thirties. The highest share of young households can be found in 
Finland followed by the US, Germany and the UK. We do not address the potential 
selection of the individuals to the samples of young heads, but we survey the typical 
country specific characteristics of young households in their respective populations in 
section 6.1. 
The cross-country differences in the distribution of young household heads across 
the three education groups capture both the varying achievements of the national 
educational systems but may also suggest the limited comparability of the educational 
systems across countries. It suggests that there is substantially higher proportion of low-
educated and substantially lower proportion of high-educated in Italy and in the UK, 
when compared to the rest of the countries. Household heads in Italy are more likely, 
while the ones in Germany are less likely to form couples compared to the other three 
countries. 
Similar to headship, both marital status and children may be endogenous to the 
factors we are focusing on, in particular, to the situation in the housing market and 
mortgage availability. We discuss this issue later in the text. Young heads in Germany 
and Finland have fewer children younger than 15, compared to the US, the UK and 
Italian heads. The former two countries thus also form smaller households compared to 
the rest. 
  Self-employment and entrepreneurship and home ownership are also interlinked, 
although the effect may go in both directions. The self-employed, who typically have  
less certain and more volatile income may either prefer renting to homeownership, or   14
                                                
may be denied mortgages for that reason, and therefore credit constrained – excluded 
from the market. On the other hand, entrepreneurial activities may often be own-home 
dependent and positively related to housing tenure. In our sample, 30 % of the young 
households in Italy
5 are self-employed, 12% and 11 % in the UK and Finland, and less 
than 10 % in Germany and the US.   
  Having other (unsecured / consumer) debt may reflect both the willingness to take 
on the risks of borrowing on the one hand (demand) and the development of credit 
markets in general (supply) on the other. At the same time, it may capture the economic 
condition and the degree of credit constraints. Finally, individuals with mortgages may be 
less willing to add other forms of debt to their housing debt. Consistent with the credit 
market development story, the proportions of young households with other debt is much 
lower in Italy and Germany than elsewhere, with the highest proportion in the US. We do 
not find any striking differences among homeowners and non-homeowners holding other 
debt, except for the Italian renters and US homeowners. About 10 percentage more of the 
Italian renters and US homeowners, hold other debt then their home-owning and renting 
counterparts, respectively.  
When we compare the key characteristics of young home owners and non-owners, 
we find, consistently with our expectations,  the first group of heads to be older, more 
educated, married, have more children and a bigger household size than the heads who do 
not own their homes. Homeowners also have higher disposable household income, and 
wealth in terms of the financial assets.  Considering that typical mortgage down payments 
are in the range of 20-30% of home values we could expect homeowners to have less 
liquid assets compared to those that have not purchased their homes (yet), ceteris paribus.  
 
5 The definition of self-employed household indicator is that either the head and/or spouse is self-
employed.   15
In addition, in all countries, young homeowners are more likely to be self-employed, 
compared to renters. (Results are available from the authors upon request.) 
5. Methodology 
We start our analysis by documenting the cross-country variation in 
homeownership rates and homeownership-income inequality among the young, and then 
we link it to mortgage take-up, mortgage availability, alternative sources of 
homeownership financing, and credit constraints of the young across the five countries 
under analysis. We first focus on cross-country differences in homeownership rates. We 
then analyze the relationship between home ownership and income, looking at the 
distribution of home owners across household income deciles. We develop several 
measures of homeownership-income inequality, such as homeownership in the lowest 
decile, various ratios of homeownership rates across deciles (the ninth to the fifth, the ninth 
to the first, the fifth to the first), and the rank of the first decile in which the home 
ownership rate exceeds half, and the cross country average, then we compare these 
measures across countries.  
Next, we take into account the observed heterogeneity across different 
households, and estimate for each country separately a probability model of 
homeownership as a function of income, while controlling for other factors, such as age, 
education, family structure, presence of children, self-employment status and so on. We 
follow two specifications regarding the household income variable: first, the logarithmic 
function of household income, second (more flexible), the ten binary indicators reflecting 
the household income decile. The coefficient of the logarithm of income and the 
coefficients of the ten (nine with a constant) binary variables provide us with further and 
improved measures of homeownership-income inequality. We present the cross-country 
differences in the marginal effects of income variables on homeownership of the country-  16
specific representative households, as well as the differences in the marginal effects of 
income variables for the same representative household across different countries, to 
document what drives the observed cross country variation in these effects: either it is 
due to the underlying distribution of endowments (income) and other factors, or due to 
the differences in the relationships between income and homeownership. 
We further explore this issue as follows: we predict cross-country counterfactual 
homeownership rates using the population (sample) of one country and the estimated 
coefficients from the other. The pair-wise cross-country comparisons allow us to identify 
whether it is the differences in the characteristics of the country-specific populations or 
the differences in the country-specific effects of these characteristics on homeownership, 
that drive the cross-country variation in homeownership rates. This procedure is similar 
in nature to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, when applied to binary outcome models. 
As it is the case for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, while the procedure is useful for 
identification of the two components of homeownership rates, it fully ignores any 
causality between them, i.e. the fact that the distribution of the characteristics may reflect 
their impact and vice versa. However, the question of causality cannot be addressed with 
data available for each country only for one point in time.  
After providing a thorough cross-country comparison of homeownership-income 
inequality, we explore to what extent the observed variation in this inequality may be a 
result of cross-country differences in credit market development and mortgage availability. 
First, we look at cross-country differences in mortgage take-up rates among the young (18 
to 40 years of age) and explore what percentage of owned homes is funded through 
mortgages. Next, we document the distribution of mortgage take-up rates across household 
income deciles and estimate a probability model of mortgage take-up. We control for 
financial wealth as well as for the risk aversion concerning the willingness to borrow by an   17
                                                
indicator of whether a household has any other debt except for mortgage.
6  The marginal 
effects of income on having a mortgage and the predicted counterfactual homeownership 
rates complement our previous findings and indicate to what extent mortgage take up 
explains the documented cross-country variation in homeownership among young. 
6. Housing market characteristics 
6.1. Home ownership, mortgage, home value, home equity and housing affordability 
across the population 
Next we look in more detail at the housing market and examine homeownership, 
mortgage, home value and home equity for the whole population and our sample of 
young households. We compare a cross-section of age profiles of these variables across 
countries. We use a smoothing technique, which regresses homeownership on a third-
order age polynomial. 
First, we discuss differences in homeownership for the young and across countries 
found in Figure 1
7.  We find similar results to our descriptive statistics in section 4. 
Among the young in our sample homeownership in Germany is the lowest in relation to 
the other countries. The highest homeownership among the young is in the UK.  
Next, we examine the role of mortgage funding in homeownership (Figure 2). As 
previously indicated homeownership among young households in Italy does not depend 
on mortgage availability to a great extent and this is true at different ages. The highest 
mortgage take-up is in the UK and the US. Mortgages are also the biggest source of 
financing in these two countries (Figure 3). They provide about 80% of the funding for 
young homeowners in most countries and about 20% in Italy. This country is quite 
unique in having low debt and low mortgage take-up. 
 
6 As discussed later, this coefficient may also reflect other factors than just risk aversion towards debt. 
7 A detailed discussion of differences by age can be found in Bicakova and Sierminska (2007) and for the 
elderly in Chiuri and Jappelli (2007)   18
es.  
                                                
Next, we look at home values. In Table 3a we find them to be the highest on 
average and at the median in Germany, the UK, Italy, the US and Finland for the whole 
population. For the younger population the ranking is similar, with Italy moving to 
second place indicating that young homeowners in Italy own relatively more expensive 
homes across countries compared to the whole population.
8 One must not forget that 
even though Germany exhibits high home values, homeownership is only 20% versus 
51% among the young in Italy. It  may be the case that low home ownership in Germany 
is the result of high housing prices or due to selection – across income - only the very rich 
own their homes – and they purchase expensive hom
Home value is interesting in its own right as it can be used as a measure of long-
run potential wealth. Home equity on the other hand is a good indicator of current wealth 
as housing is the main wealth portfolio component. In the whole population, the highest 
home equity is observed in countries with the lowest debt, in Germany and Italy, then in 
the UK, the US and Finland measured both by the mean and median. Among the young 
population we find a re-ranking among countries with the highest value of home equity. 
Italy has the highest home equity for the young followed by Germany, the UK, the US 
and Finland. Big gaps between home values and home equity are present in the UK and 
the US particularly for the young due to high loan take-up. In most countries we note the 
existence of negative home equity values indicating either a decline in home values since 
the purchase date (less likely since data is based on a self-assessed current value and 
collected during periods of home values appreciation), or the ability to take additional 
loans using home as collateral (this could be the case in Finland and the UK, where 
mortgage information is combined with other housing debt). 
 
8 This fact is confirmed in Guiso and Jappelli (2002) whose estimates indicate that young adults stay longer 
with their parents and as a result shorten the saving period before home ownership and increase the value of 
the house purchased.   19
Home debt for the whole population is the highest in the US, UK, Germany, 
Finland and Italy. Among the young it is a very important component of home equity in 
Germany, the UK, the US, Finland, and Italy. 
Home affordability is also an important characteristic of a countries housing 
market. We proxy for this, by examining home value-income ratios. We divide the 
income distribution into quantiles and within these quantiles calculate mean and median 
home values and incomes for homeowners. The ratios of these values are presented in 
Table 4. First, we find that the housing wealth/income ratios diminish for all countries as 
we move up the income distribution. Second, the rankings across countries in terms of the 
highest home value to income ratios are quite consistent across the quantiles with 
Germany and Italy exhibiting the highest ratios (being the least affordable), followed by 
the UK, the US and Finland. The highest ratios are in countries with the highest home 
values and lower incomes, the lowest where there are lower incomes and low home 
values. The wealth-income ratios are quite similar in all countries for the top quantile. 
6.2. Institutions 
  Homeownership is substantially affected by the country-specific institutions and 
various market regulations.  We next discuss the main institutions that affect housing and 
mortgage markets in the countries under analysis and discuss the implications they are 
likely to have in explaining the documented homeownership and mortgage take-up 
differences.  
The tax system has a substantial impact on the incentives to purchase a home, to 
finance the purchase through a mortgage, as well as an impact on transaction costs related 
to housing turnover, i.e. the conditions of buying and selling one’s home. In addition to 
the general wealth and property taxes, there are taxes and implicit tax treatments that 
directly affect homeownership. Compared to other forms of housing, homeowners benefit   20
                                                
from not paying rent and from increases in the value of their homes. The neutral tax 
treatment implies that imputed rent be taxed as additional income and capital gains (i.e. 
home value appreciation) be subject to capital gains tax. This is, however, rarely the case, 
suggesting that most of the tax system implicitly favor homeownership over renting. In 
addition, in some cases mortgage interest payments are fully deductible.
9  
As reported in Table 5, in general imputed rents are not taxed in the countries 
under analysis with the exception of Italy, for the case for principal owner-occupied 
dwellings. Capital gains on housing assets are taxable in all five countries, but most of 
the principal homes of long term homeowners are exempt from this tax. The only 
exception once again is Italy, where while the owner-occupied homes are not exempted, 
they are subject to 50 % of the value. There are differences across countries in the 
definition of the long term occupancy, ranging from more than 2 years ownership in 
Finland and the US
10  to 10 years in Germany. In the UK, all owner-occupied homes are 
exempt from the capital gain tax. Mortgage interest payments are tax deductible in 
Finland, Italy and the US but there is no tax relief on the interest payments in Germany 
and the UK. 
In this paper, we focus on the degree of development of the mortgage market as a 
crucial determinant of homeownership. Mortgage market maturity depends on the general 
legal environment (such as the contract enforcement, judicial efficiency, collateral and 
bankruptcy laws), and on credit information availability and information sharing on one 
hand, and on the direct mortgage market regulations on the other. More specifically, the 
first three rows of Table 5 referring to enforcing contracts, report the number of 
procedures from the moment the plaintiff files a lawsuit in court until the moment of 
 
9 In our case, this applies to landlords in Finland and in the US. 
10 This was the case in the US until 2002.   21
                                                
payment, the time in calendar days required to resolve a dispute, and the cost of court 
fees and attorney fees expressed as a percentage of debt. According to all three criteria, in 
Italy, contract enforcement is by far the most difficult among the five countries. Germany 
follows, in terms of the number of procedures, time and then the direct cost. The rest of 
the countries fare similarly well, with Finland having more procedures but the lowest 
cost, while the UK and the US exhibit the opposite. 
In the next section of Table 5 on getting credit, the legal rights index measures the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index includes 7 aspects related to legal rights in 
collateral law and 3 aspects in bankruptcy law. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with 
higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand 
access to credit.
11 The legal environment is the most favourable to lending in the UK, 
then Germany, the US, Finland and finally, again the least favourable in Italy. 
The next three rows indicate the coverage, scope, quality and accessibility of 
credit information available through public and private credit registries. Credit 
Information Index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of 
more credit information.
12 Credit information is somewhat less available in Italy and 
Finland than in the other countries, in terms of both the index and the coverage. The 
index of mortgage market regulations in a straightforward manner ranks the countries 
from Italy with the most regulated mortgage market, followed by Germany and Finland, 
to the US and the UK with the most deregulated mortgage market.  
The mortgage market characteristics are consistent with the analyzed institutional 
and regulatory environments. Mortgage market development, as measured by overall 
 
11 See Appendix for details. 
12 See Appendix for details.   22
                                                
mortgage take-up, and the dependence of mortgage on household income, closely 
corresponds to the degree of mortgage market regulation in the five countries: countries 
with the most regulated mortgage markets such as Italy and Germany have the least 
developed mortgage markets. 
In the five countries we analyze, one clear pattern emerges from the institutional 
information that we survey: the legal as well as regulatory environment in Italy are by far 
the least favorable for the development of the mortgage market, while those in the UK are 
the most supportive. While the legal institutions and information sharing possibly 
facilitates lending in Germany, the strong mortgage market regulations work in the 
opposite direction.   
Less regulated markets are likely to be more competitive and offer greater variety 
and flexibility. As regards to collateral requirements and the mortgage length, reported in 
Table 5, the typical loan to value ratio and the duration ranges from 78 % and 30 years in 
the US, to 55 % and 15 years in Italy. The mortgage market completeness index describes 
the supply side of the mortgage markets both in terms of the range of products offered, 
the choice of the alternative repayment schemes and the period over which interest rates 
are fixed. It also contains information on the typical age, income and economic status of 
the borrowers that are granted mortgage. The much lower value of the index for Italy and 
Germany (57 and 58 respectively) suggest a rather limited supply of mortgages when 
compared to the UK (value 86).
13 
The aggregate housing and mortgage market characteristics reported in the last 
two rows seem to be consistent with the institutional environments described. The 
aggregate homeownership rates follow the same ranking as the share of residential 
mortgage debt in GDP and also correspond to the legal and regulatory conditions in the 
 
13 Unfortunately, comparable index is not available for Finland and the US.   23
five countries. The UK with the most favorable and the least regulated conditions has the 
highest homeownership rate of 69 % and the 64.4 share of debt in GDP, whereas 
Germany with one of the most regulated and least developed mortgage markets has the 
lowest homeownership rate of 42 %.  The only country for which the homeownership 
rate does not correspond to its mortgage take up ranking is Italy. While Italy, with the 
most regulated mortgage market and least favorable conditions has indeed the lowest 
share of debt in GDP of 11.4 %, it has the highest occupancy rate of 80 %. This finding is 
consistent with our aggregate figures for the young households. It confirms that in Italy 
housing is fairly independent of the mortgage market, due to other means of home 
acquisition such as family transfers and passing of the property from generation to 
generation.    
In the policy section of the paper we also discuss  to what extent other institutions, 
such as labor market regulation and housing subsidies can be related to the observed 
cross-country differences in homeownership. For example, employment protection and 
the variation in the length of the employment contracts of the young individuals are likely 
to affect the decisions of credit institutions to grant a mortgage.   
7. Results 
7.1. Distribution of Homeownership across Household Income Deciles 
Next, we look at the variation of homeownership across the income distribution. In Table 
6a we find a wide variation of rates within countries. The biggest range is in Finland 
(from 9% in the lowest decile to 90% in the highest) and the lowest in Italy (from 40% in 
the lowest decile to 74% in the highest). In all countries—although within a 30 
percentage point difference -- we find the highest homeownership in the top decile. The 
highest rate is in the UK (92%) followed by Finland (90%), the US (87%), Italy (74%) 
and Germany (60%).    24
In the same Table, we next identify at which stage in the income distribution the 
probability of becoming a homeowner exceeds 50%. This is highlighted with the light 
shading. As expected this occurs fairly early in the income distribution in a country with 
high ownership rates (the UK) and fairly late in the distribution in a country with low 
ownership rates (Germany). For the other countries this occurs in the 6
th decile. We also 
determine when the probability of ownership exceeds the country average. This happens 
in the 4
th decile in Finland and Italy and in the 6
th decile in the other countries.  
Next, we examine whether the mortgage take-up among homeowners is evenly 
distributed across the income distribution. An even mortgage distribution would suggest 
that credit constraints are not binding, as access to credit is not limited by the current 
income. In Table 6b, this is found to be the case in the UK, where mortgage take-up is 
nearly 90% throughout the income distribution. In the other countries there is more 
variation in the mortgage take-up, but in all countries except Italy it exceeds 80% past the 
3
rd and 4
th decile. In all countries mortgage take-up increases as we move up the income 
distribution. Italy is the only country where this is not the case and there is a lot more 
variation. 
To examine homeownership profiles across the income distribution for the whole 
population (Figure 4), we use a smoothing technique, which regresses homeownership on 
a third-order indicator for income percentiles Finland has the steepest profile and Italy is 
at the other extreme with the flattest profile throughout the income distribution.  In terms 
of homeownership rates the highest are in the UK and the lowest in Germany at nearly all 
percentiles. This closely resembles the results for the younger population only. 
7.2. Homeownership-income inequality measures  
In order to pin point the differences in the distribution of homeownership across income we 
reach for a few summary inequality measures. First, we look at decile ratios for   25
homeownership. As can be seen in Table 7a, the highest differences between the 90
th and 
10
th percentile are in Germany, Finland and the US. In Finland and the US more of the 
differences are taking place between the bottom decile and the median then between the top 
decile and the median. In Germany and the other countries it is more or less evenly 
distributed between the top and the bottom of the distribution. The inequality rankings in 
mortgage holdings follow those in homeownership. The only difference is that a majority 
of the inequality is taking place at the bottom of the distribution, where there is bigger 
homeownership variation across the income deciles compared to the top half of the income 
distribution. For homeowners the inequality in mortgage holding is more or less evenly 
distributed across the top and bottom of the distribution in all countries except Italy. Here 
we find more variation among homeowners in the bottom half of the income distribution. 
Next, we estimate several probit probability models of homeownership, mortgage 
and mortgage financed homeownership as a function of log of income to find out in which 
country the effect of income is the strongest.  The results in Table 7b indicate that the effect 
of income on homeownership and mortgage is the strongest in Finland, Germany and the 
US. The strongest effect of income on mortgage for homeowners is in the US, followed by 
Germany, Finland, the UK and Italy. The low coefficient in Italy supports the fact that 
homeownership in this country relies on other means of financing besides mortgages. 
7.3. Conditioning on other factors - Marginal effects 
In the previous sections, we have focused on the homeownership and mortgage rates and 
how they are related to household income. We next take into account other household 
characteristics to control for other aspects of the probability of home ownership, namely 
household preferences. We estimate a full probit model of the probability of home 
ownership and mortgage respectively, as a function of several demographic and economic 
characteristics of the household, as well as a set of binary indicators for household income   26
                                                
deciles. Once again, we are primarily interested in the differences in homeownership and 
mortgage rates across the income deciles.
14  
Most of the effects of the demographic characteristics are similar across countries 
and in line with our expectations. Couple, households with children below 15 years of age, 
as well as larger households have a larger probability of being homeowners (with only a 
few exceptions in which case the effect is negative but always not significant). The 
probability of homeownership increases with age but in a decreasing way and the effect is 
often not significant. The insignificance of some of the demographic variables may also be 
caused by the substantial homogeneity of our sample of the young.  
Education increases the probability of owning ones home. The self-employed are more 
likely to own their homes, particularly in Finland, and except for Germany where the effect 
is not significant. Having financial assets greater than 3000 EUR is associated with a higher 
probability of homeownership in all countries. Interestingly, having other (unsecured) 
consumer debt decreases the probability of homeownership everywhere except in the US.  
The key effect of interest – the marginal effects of being in income decile n rather 
than in the first income decile - are presented in Figure 5 (and Appendix Table A.2a). The 
magnitudes of the coefficients signify the increase in homeownership probability relative to 
the first income decile. The slopes of the lines reveal the inter-decile differences in home 
ownership. 
Controlling for individual specific characteristic reveals that homeownership is 
distributed most unequally in the US and Germany, although other deciles are closer to the 
first income decile in Germany compared to the US. Finland comes next; while Italy and 
the UK have homeownership most evenly distributed across income. When we perform a 
similar exercise for the probability of having a mortgage, the results are fairly similar (See 
 
14 Both probit regression output and marginal effects are available from the authors upon request.   27
Figure 6 and Appendix Table A.2b). As expected, the differences between all deciles (but 
in particular between the first decile and the rest) increase for most of the countries, as 
home-ownership sponsored by other funds (such as private transfers) less dependent on 
income than mortgages are ruled out. In addition, in two countries, Italy and Finland, 
although homeownership probability is highest in the very top decile, the mortgage 
probability is smaller than in the ninth decile, possibly suggesting that individuals with 
very high income have also greater access to other resources (wealth, private transfers) 
when becoming home owners. 
7.4. Decomposition of the Key Determinants -Counterfactual Predictions 
  Finally, we try to identify the cross-country differences in household 
characteristics (right hand side variables) from the cross-country differences in the effect 
of these characteristics (coefficients and marginal effects), in order to reveal how the two 
of them contribute to explaining the cross-country variation in home ownership and 
mortgage rates. We simulate counterfactual predictions of the home ownership rates and 
mortgage rates, using household characteristics from one country and combining them 
with coefficients - estimated in the full probit model – from another country. The results 
are found in Table 8a and 8b. The rows correspond to the household characteristics from 
the country specified in the first column and the columns correspond to the respective 
sets of country-specific coefficients, with the exception of the first column that gives the 
actual homeownership rate in each of the countries for comparison. The fit of our models 
can be read from the table by comparing the true value with the corresponding cell where 
household characteristics and estimated coefficients from the same country are combined, 
yielding the prediction of the model.  
First, we observe, that although the UK has the highest actual home ownership 
rates, it is the household characteristics in Italy that lead to the highest predicted   28
counterfactual rates when combined with coefficients from other countries. In other 
words, Italian household have the highest predicted home ownership regardless in which 
countries (environments, institutions, mortgage markets and housing markets) they are. 
US households come next (except in Germany), while the ranking of the UK and the 
Finish households alternate. German households, on the other hand, have the lowest 
predicted home ownership rate everywhere except for Germany.  
  In terms of the effect household characteristics have in different countries, as 
reflected by the estimated coefficients, we find that the predicted homeownership rates 
are the highest in the UK for households from all five countries. It is interesting to 
observe, that it is Finland that follows. It is the “unfavorable” ranking of the 
homeownership-enhancing household characteristics in Finland (compared to other 
countries) that is responsible for the observed Finish home ownership rate ranking only 
fourth. In terms of the environments and institutions, Finland ranks as second. The 
opposite holds for the US, where household characteristics are more favorable, while 
regime ranks as third or fourth. Germany is at the other end of the spectrum: no matter 
what the household characteristics are (irrespective of the country), any of the five 
samples reaches the lowest homeownership rate in Germany.   
In addition, it is interesting to notice that in the case of Germany, favorable 
household characteristics do relatively better in unfavorable regime, as German 
households rank second in Germany after Italy. 
To summarize, we find that while it is the Italian households that are –in terms of 
their characteristics - most likely to own their homes, it is in the UK where the regime is 
the most favorable. In Germany, both household characteristics and the regime is the 
least favorable. While household’s characteristics in Finland are relatively less favorable 
than in the US, Finish regime fares better than the one in the US, so the ranking of the   29
two countries vary in these two respects. The regime in Italy on the other hand is 
comparable to that of the US, and fares better for Finish and German households but 
worse for the US and the UK. 
We conclude that although household characteristics play some role in explaining 
the observed (and predicted) variation in home ownership rates across the five countries, 
it is mostly the country specific effects (market evaluations) of these characteristics 
determined by the institutional environment as well as the functioning of the housing and 
mortgage markets that drive the main result (i.e. the observed ranking of the five 
countries).  
  Next, in Table 8b, we look at the respective roles of household characteristics and 
country specific regimes in the variation in the mortgage rates. Interestingly, 
characteristics of the Italian households again yield the highest mortgage rates despite the 
fact that Italy has the lowest actual mortgage rate among the five countries. The ranking 
of the other countries in terms of the effect of different household characteristics is also 
the same as for the home ownership rate. In terms of the regimes, the UK coefficients are 
again the most favorable. The second most favorable regime is again in Finland, but the 
unfavorable household characteristics bring the country in the ranking of the actual 
mortgage rate behind the US, where the regime and the characteristics rank again in the 
opposite way than in Finland. The Italian regime however is now the least favorable to 
the mortgage take up, followed by the German one. To summarize, with the exception of 
the Italian regime, the results in the last two tables give similar answers.  
8. Conclusion 
This paper uses the newly constructed Luxembourg Wealth Study Database to 
bring detailed evidence on homeownership and homeownership-income inequality 
among young households in Finland, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US.  We explore   30
the role of mortgage finance in the cross-country variation in homeownership among 
young households and in the distribution of homeownership across their income. We find 
that, with the exception of Italy, where family transfers substitute the limited access to 
credit, the observed patterns of homeownership among young are mostly driven by 
mortgage take-up as the primary source of finance for a home purchase. Our results show 
that countries with mature mortgage markets, such as the UK, have higher 
homeownership rates and lower homeownership-income inequality among young 
households than countries with less developed mortgage markets such as Germany. Even 
in countries with highly developed mortgage markets, like in the US, homeownership and 
mortgage availability among the lower income deciles are limited (homeownership rate is 
distributed more unequally), compared to the UK or Finland. Policies supporting home 
ownership among young households may then need to target specifically the low-income 
groups.    
  Our findings suggest that in four out of the five countries, mortgage is the key 
financial tool used by young households to purchase their homes. In these countries the 
observed homeownership rates, as well as, the distribution of homeownership across 
household income levels are determined by the degree of the mortgage market 
development. Mortgage market development, as measured by overall mortgage take-up, 
and the dependence of mortgage on household income, closely corresponds to the degree 
of mortgage market regulation in the five countries: countries with the most regulated 
mortgage markets such as Italy and Germany have the least developed mortgage markets.  
The legal environment, such as contract enforcement and judicial efficiency, and 
information sharing are also crucial for the development of the mortgage market. 
Although the small number of countries does not allow us to show any 
quantitative evidence on the effect of institutions and policies on the homeownership   31
among the young, the observed variation in homeownership rates, mortgage market 
maturity, and size of the rental market, which the five countries represent, enables us to 
draw the following qualitative conclusions: Mortgage market regulation hinders 
mortgage market development, decreases homeownership rates among the young and 
increases the homeownership-income inequality. As the discussed integration of the 
European mortgage markets would also involve mortgage market deregulation in 
countries with limited mortgage availability, it is likely that it will enhance the 
homeownership rates among the young households there, and therefore lead to further 
convergence of the homeownership patterns in Europe. The impact of the integration 
will, however, depend on the housing alternatives available to the young in these 
countries, namely the size and the terms of the rental market. The discussion about the 
mortgage market integration and deregulation should therefore also consider these 
alternatives, and in particular, the current country-specific rental market regulations. If 
low transaction costs at the housing and mortgage market are assured by the regulatory 
environment, mortgage market integration may also enhance labor market efficiency 
through increased within-country and cross-border mobility. 
9. Possible Policy Implications 
   Integration of the European mortgage markets, one of the topics widely discussed 
at the European Commission (see for example European Commission 2006), presupposes 
harmonization of the mortgage market regulation across its member countries. Such 
harmonization would require substantial mortgage market deregulation in countries like 
Italy or Germany, when compared to their current regulatory environment.  
In the section below we will discuss possible policy implications of our findings 
in light of further deregulation and integration of the mortgage market on 
homeownership, geographical labor mobility and labor contracts.     32
Homeownership rates and homeownership-income inequality 
It is likely that deregulation and opening up of the mortgage markets will increase 
the overall access across income levels of young households to mortgage loans. Based on 
our findings, we expect further mortgage market development in countries with less 
developed mortgage markets to increase homeownership rates and reduce 
homeownership income inequality among young households. Our results suggest that 
mortgage market integration will enhance convergence of homeownership rates and 
homeownership income inequality across countries. However, as our findings point out, it 
is not only mortgage market regulation and legal environment that affect mortgage 
market development. Demand for homeownership and therefore the need for mortgages 
also depends on other aspects of the housing market such as alternative forms of housing 
and how their costs compare with the price of homeownership. The analysis of the five 
substantially different countries undergone in this paper enables us to lay down, discuss 
and assess the likely impact of these additional factors as well. 
  The effect of mortgage market development resulting from mortgage market 
integration is likely to differ across countries. While in Germany, a fairly developed (and 
regulated) rental market offers renting as an attractive alternative to homeownership 
(Ditch et al 2001), this is not the case in Italy, where the major housing alternative of the 
young individuals is to postpone marriage and household formation and stay with parents 
until they accumulate necessary savings or until they acquire homes from parents in the 
form of transfers. As a result, as suggested by Martins and Villanueva (2006), the effect 
of increased mortgage availability on nest leaving is expected to be particularly high in 
the Southern European countries. Besides the relative cost of homeownership and renting 
within the considered countries, cross-country differences in housing prices relative to 
average income (house affordability) will be both affected by but also will itself alter the   33
impact of the integration of mortgage markets on homeownership rates and their 
distribution across income particularly at the bottom of the income distribution where 
these differences are the greatest (see Table 4 on housing affordability and Table 6a on 
homeownership across income deciles).  
Geographical mobility and labor market 
It is not straightforward what effect would mortgage market deregulation, 
increased mortgage availability and a subsequent increase in homeownership have on 
geographical labor mobility. While a developed mortgage market and a well-functioning 
housing market is expected to enhance geographical mobility, as is the case in the US, 
there are microeconomic studies ( such as Henley 1998), that find in the case of the 
unemployed, that homeownership may reduce mobility and therefore preserve regional 
variation in unemployment. The conditions of housing market turnover also determine 
the relationship between homeownership and geographical mobility. High transaction 
costs in the housing market, for example, reduce home turnover and consequently may 
reduce geographical mobility.  
In our five country study, we see a positive relationship between mortgage 
financed homeownership and geographic mobility (Table 9). Among the five countries 
we consider, Italy is clearly the one with the lowest across-region geographical mobility 
(10 %), while Finland is the highest (36 %). Germany has the second lowest mobility 
after Italy (19 %). The UK follows with about 25 %. These patterns are confirmed when 
within EU and outside EU mobility is considered. For comparison, over 40% of the US 
population has been defined as movers (Schachter, Franklin and Perry 2003, Table 1). 
This shows that in countries with high homeownership rates financed through mortgages 
we observe high geographical mobility.   34
The most frequent reason for geographical mobility among prime age individuals 
is moving to a new job. Geographical mobility therefore also reflects labor mobility 
which is crucial for efficient matching of job searchers to vacancies. As a result, a well-
functioning housing market, i.e. market with low transaction cost and high turnover 
(where it is easy to buy and sell one’s home) is a key prerequisites of labor mobility. 
Increased access to housing and less frictions to geographical mobility could therefore 
also result in higher labor market efficiency. When we look at labor mobility across the 
five countries, they rank exactly the same as when compared to geographical mobility: 
over 30 % of Italians have never changed their employer after the age of 35, around 20 % 
of Germans, 14 % of Finns and less than 10 % of British people (see European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006, Figure 18 and 
23). It has been well documented that US has much higher geographical and labor 
mobility compared to the rest of the countries in our analysis. The important finding is 
that it is not the homeownership per se that is positively correlated with high 
geographical and labor mobility but mortgage financed homeownership, which does not 
restrict the location of one’s home to a large extent. This has been shown to be the case in 
Italy-- the least mobile country, with the smallest mortgage take-up and the second 
highest homeownership rate in our sample. The effect of mortgage market deregulation 
on labor mobility and labor market efficiency is once again likely to vary across 
countries, depending on other housing alternatives. In the presence of high transaction 
cost of buying and selling one’s home, a substantial rental market (and rent subsidies 
(Ditch et al 2001)) in Germany may imply that renting enhances higher labor mobility 
than housing tenure. On the other hand, mortgage market development in Italy that 
enables homeownership among young individuals, is likely to be crucial for the increase 
in geographical and labor mobility there.   35
Cross-border mobility and integrated labor market 
While mortgage market development is likely to increase regional mobility within 
countries, the integration of the mortgage markets is likely to enhance cross-border 
mobility as well. Immigrants are typically in a worse situation compared to natives when 
applying for mortgages due to, for example, the lack of credit history information or 
shorter labor contracts than natives. The latter has also been an issue for young 
individuals entering the job market, where temporary instead of regular contracts have 
been offered (see for example Blau and Kahn (2002)). As most of the cross-border 
mobility within EU takes place among young households, the increase in mortgage 
access to the young across countries is likely to enhance the integrated European labor 
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Germany 2002  0.214 0.185 0.866 3,270 
Finland 1998  0.433 0.386 0.891 1,102 
USS 2001  0.479 0.427 0.891 1,130 
Italy 2002  0.509 0.157 0.308 1,178 
UK 2000  0.639 0.621 0.971 1,335 
 
Note: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals 
excluded), Weighted with sample weights, Sorted by home-ownership rates. Extremely 
rich individuals are defined as having financial assets greater than the 95
th percentile of 
the distribution of financial assets. 
 
Table 2. Demographic characteristics of young households in our sample. 
 
 Finland Germany Italy UK  US 
age of hh head  31.02 31.97 34.04 32.07 31.19 
low education  0.17 0.13 0.48 0.35 0.13 
medium education  0.49 0.59 0.41 0.44 0.58 
high education  0.34 0.28 0.11 0.20 0.29 
Couple  0.57 0.52 0.66 0.59 0.59 
has children < 15   0.41 0.40 0.52 0.53 0.55 
self-employed  0.11 0.08 0.30 0.12 0.05 
hh size (in persons)  2.45 2.25 2.74 2.71 2.83 
has other debt  0.58 0.22 0.19 0.69 0.78 
income mean  25,905 25,950 26,011 35,618 36,513 
income median  23,917 22,961 22,423 32,446 28,988 
income min  797 298 290 337 453 
income max  219,382 248,446 233,311 236,076 305,172 
income SD  13,974 16,418 17,031 20,938 30,210 
fin assets > 3000 USD  0.40 0.33 0.67 0.39 0.45 
fin. assets mean  12,433 15,087 15,757 16,458 32,626 
fin. assets median  8,113 11,004 11,690 10,866 11,792 
fin. assets min  3,019 3,003 3,107 3,024 3,047 
fin. assets max  56,602 44,297 62,135 60,773 329,290 
fin. assets SD  10,645 10,389 13,339 14,743 52,326 
 
Notes: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals excluded), 
Weighted with sample weights, income is total disposable household income in 2002 USD, self-employed 
= head and/or spouse is self-employed, distribution of financial assets (last 5 rows) – only individuals with 






   40
Table 3a.  Home value, home equity and mortgage debt for homeowners for the total population 
sample. 
 
         
    Finland Germany  Italy  UK    USS 
home value   mean  93,079    240,470    193,644    209,754    184,131   
home value   median  75,469    218,308    155,337    156,538    124,931   
home value   min  3,773    4,401    621    5,525    1,016   
home value   max  1,132,039    8,252,641    2,485,398    1,841,619    20,300,000   
        
home equity   mean  78,354    198,177    187,853    160,255    124,439   
home equity   median  66,036    165,053    149,124    117,864    73,130   
home equity   min  -179,240    -236,576    -124,270    -736,650    -648,017   
home equity   max  1,132,039    3,576,145    2,485,398    1,565,378    20,300,000   
        
home debt   mean  14,725    42,293    5,792    47,606    59,692   
home debt   median  0    0    0    18,416    32,502   
home debt   min  0    0    0    0    0   
home debt   max  433,948    4,676,497    459,799    1,473,297    7,912,303   
 
Source: Luxembourg Wealth Study. Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 3b. Home value, home equity and mortgage debt for homeowners for young households (18 to 
40 years old). 
 
            
    Finland Germany Italy  UK    USS 
home value   mean  91,183    219,262    175,220    168,317    138,545   
home value   median  81,129    198,063    149,124    138,122    101,570   
home value   min  3,773    13,754    12,427    31,308    1,219   
home value   max  660,356    2,200,704    745,620    1,473,297    2,031,400   
           
home equity   mean  53,428    123,390    161,045    75,027    56,130   
home equity   median  43,584    100,257    136,697    49,724    30,471   
home equity   min  -132,071    -105,422    0    -139,963    -30,471   
home equity   max  653,753    2,135,381    745,620    1,473,297    1,157,898  
           
home debt   mean  37,755    95,872    14,174    93,337    82,415   
home debt   median  33,018    88,028    0    82,873    73,130   
home debt   min  0    0    0    0    0   
home debt   max  207,541    585,311    248,540    478,821    873,502   
            
            
Source: Luxembourg Wealth Study. Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
   41
Table 4. Home value and income ratios by income quantiles for homeowners in the selected sample. 
 
            
Income     Finland  Germany  Italy  UK  US 
quantiles            
1 Mean  4.06 15.26  15.44  12.15  8.11 
 Median  3.54 12.46  13.11  7.87  6.00 
 ranking  5 2  1  3  4 
          
2 Mean  3.05 8.46  7.95  5.14  3.57 
 Median  2.80 8.15  7.61  4.27  2.98 
 ranking  5 1  2  3  4 
          
3 Mean  2.61 6.91  7.25  3.92  3.07 
 Median  2.39 6.44  5.64  3.44  2.89 
 ranking  5 1  2  3  4 
          
4 Mean  2.65 5.64  5.62  3.88  2.66 
 Median  2.49 5.22  4.68  3.33  2.26 
 ranking  4 1  2  3  5 
          
5 Mean  2.43 4.73  3.89  3.33  2.65 
 Median  2.42 4.45  3.98  2.99  2.35 
 ranking  4 1  2  3  5 
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Table 5. Chosen institution characteristics in sample countries. 
 Finland  Germany  Italy  UK  US 
Tax System           
Tax on Imputed Rents  N N N* N       N 
Tax on Capital Gains   Y < 2 yr Y < 10 yr Y ** Y***  Y < 2yr 
          
Enforcing contracts     
Procedures (number)  27 30 40  19 17 
Time (days)  228 394 1210 229  300 
Cost (% of debt)  5.9 10.5 17.6 16.8  7.7 
          
Getting Credit          
Legal Rights Index  6  8  3 10 7 
Credit Information Index  56 5 6  6  
Public registry coverage (% 
adults)  00 . 5 7 0  0  
Private bureau coverage (% 
adults)  14.9 93.9 67.8 86.1 100 
  
Mortgage Market Regulation  0.5 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.3 
  
Mortgage Market Terms   
Typical 75 67 55 69  78  Loan-to-
value ratios 
(%)  Maximum 80 80 80 110  NA 
Typical loan term (years)  15-18 25-30 15 25 30 
   
Mortgage Market 
Completeness            NA  58 57 86  NA 
  
Mortgage and Housing Market 
Characteristics    
Share of owner-occupied housing 
(%) in approx. 2002  58 42 80 69 68 
Residential mortgage debt in % 
of GDP in 2002  31.8 54 11.4 64.3 58 
 
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/; Catte et al.(2004); Chiuri and Jappelli (2007); Tsatsaronis and Zhu 
(2004); LWS (2008). 
* Not for principle owner-occupied homes. ** 50 % of the value for principal   
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Table 6a. Homeownership by income deciles. 
      
Income   Finland Germany  Italy  UK  US  Total 
D e c i l e s            
1   0.092  0.053 0.404 0.338 0.133 0.132 
2   0.278  0.075 0.397 0.365 0.200 0.184 
3   0.314  0.100 0.405 0.500 0.284 0.249 
4    0.472 0.112  0.511 0.602 0.295 0.270 
5   0.472  0.160 0.410 0.597 0.414 0.361 
6    0.612  0.297  0.590  0.784 0.516 0.481 
7   0.692  0.337 0.597 0.810 0.705 0.636 
8   0.779  0.389 0.593 0.797 0.686 0.631 
9   0.788  0.520 0.541 0.851 0.878 0.790 
10   0.898  0.593 0.736 0.919 0.871 0.788 
           
Total   0.433  0.214 0.509 0.639 0.479 0.424 
          
      P ( H = 1 ) > 5 0 %      
     P(H=1)>mean(country) 
 
    
 
Table 6b. Mortgage among homeowners by income deciles 
      
Income   Finland Germany  Italy  UK  US  Total 
Deciles           
1    0.545 0.447  0.061  0.897 0.465 0.366 
2   0.749  0.768 0.155 0.893 0.714  0.624 
3    0.834 0.731  0.407 0.894 0.679 0.657 
4   0.741  0.786  0.2 0.932 0.802 0.707 
5   0.836  0.814 0.251 0.943 0.823 0.767 
6   0.806  0.762 0.316 0.988  0.971  0.88 
7   0.892  0.893 0.234 0.947 0.936 0.881 
8   0.903  0.903 0.378 0.995 0.916 0.876 
9    0.845 0.924 0.43 0.95  0.971  0.935 
10   0.858  0.929 0.418 0.962 0.989 0.911 
           
Total    0.82  0.845 0.288 0.947 0.889 0.825 
          
      P(M=1/H=1)>50%      
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Table 7a. Inequality of homeownership, mortgages and mortgage financed homeownership.     
             
Income Finland  Germany Italy UK  US
Deciles       
Homeownership    
P90/p10  8.57 9.81 1.34 2.52 6.60
P90/p50  1.67 3.25 1.32 1.43 2.12
P50/p10  5.13 3.02 1.01 1.77 3.11
          
Mortgage          
P90/p10  14.44 20.21 8.79 2.60 13.76
P90/p50  1.83 3.59 2.16 1.45 2.51
P50/p10  7.90 5.63 4.07 1.80 5.48
       
Mortgage-financed 
home-ownership        
P90/p10  1.55 2.07 7.05 1.06 2.09
P90/p50  1.01 1.14 1.71 1.01 1.18
P50/p10  1.53 1.82 4.11 1.05 1.77
       
    
 





Table 7b. Probability of homeownership, mortgage and mortgage financed 
homeownership based on income (coefficient on log of income). 
 
 Finland  Germany Italy UK  US
       
Homeownership  1.110 0.960 0.382 0.404 0.964
       
Mortgage  1.170 1.025 0.511 0.490 1.108
    
Mortgage-financed 
home-ownership  .315 .444 .261 .268 .703
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Table 8a – Counterfactual Predictions – Home-ownership 
 
Xs TRUE  Xbhat(FI) Xbhat(GE) Xbhat(IT) Xbhat(UK) Xbhat(US)
            
Finland   0.433 0.459 0.195 0.404 0.662 0.366
Germany   0.214 0.394 0.228 0.386 0.605 0.258
Italy   0.509  0.642 0.288 0.499 0.772  0.535
UK   0.639 0.489 0.221 0.393 0.644 0.423
US  0.481 0.521 0.223 0.428 0.67 0.438
 
 
Notes: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals excluded), 
Weighted with sample weights,  
 
Table 8b – counterfactual predictions – has mortgage 
 
Xs TRUE  Xbhat(FI) Xbhat(GE) Xbhat(IT) Xbhat(UK) Xbhat(US)
            
Finland   0.386 0.397 0.159 0.129 0.624 0.318
Germany   0.185 0.381 0.194 0.107 0.577 0.227
Italy   0.157  0.479 0.229 0.164 0.719  0.463
UK   0.620 0.434 0.187 0.131 0.624 0.378
US  0.429 0.46 0.187 0.149 0.646 0.391
 
Notes: Estimation Sample (head and spouse 18-40 years old, extremely rich individuals 


















Finland  68 36 5 3
Italy  46 8 2 0
Germany  62 19 5 4
Luxembourg  57 21 14 3
Sweden  70 44 8 5
UK  55 25 7 6
 
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 




















































Homeowners with mortgage by age
 















Homeownership by income percentiles
 
Figure 5. Probability of homeownership based on full probit (coefficient on log of income 
relative to first decile). 
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Figure 6. Probability of mortgage based on full probit (coefficient on log of income relative 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Supportive tables 











        
Germany 2002  .408 .193 .477 12308 
Finland 1998  .638 .283 .417 3893 
USS 2001  .676 .434 .641 4442 
Italy 2002  .688 .102 .133 8011 
UK 2000  .705 .415 .571 4750 
 
Note: Estimation Sample (Whole population), Weighted with sample weights, Sorted by 
home-ownership rates 
   
Table A. 2a. Marginal Effects of Income Deciles - Homeownership 
 
 
 Finland  Germany  Italy UK  US 
Deciles ME t-st  ME  t-st ME t-st ME t-st ME t-st 
D2 0.05  0.65  0.00  0.04 0.04 0.62 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.56 
D3 0.03  0.42  0.01  0.18 0.10 1.43 0.05 0.91 0.15 1.75 
D4 0.18  2.88  0.01  0.20 0.14 2.05 0.09 1.64 0.09 1.04 
D5 0.11  1.48  0.05  1.10 0.11 1.58 0.05 0.86 0.17 1.98 
D6 0.22  3.50  0.12  2.64 0.20 3.16 0.17 3.68 0.26 2.96 
D7 0.24  3.93  0.14  2.98 0.21 3.26 0.19 4.23 0.37 4.27 
D8 0.33  7.17  0.22  4.59 0.27 4.38 0.13 2.41 0.34 3.91 
D9 0.31  5.84  0.34  6.35 0.17 2.46 0.17 3.41 0.50 5.66 
D10 0.35  8.67  0.35  6.33 0.24 3.56 0.21 4.22 0.51 5.15 
 
Note: t-statistics in Germany and the US have been corrected for multiple imputations. 
 
 
Table A. 2b. Marginal Effects of Income Deciles – Mortgage Probability 
 
 Finland  Germany  Italy  UK US 
Deciles ME t-st  ME  t-st ME t-st ME t-st ME t-st 
D2  0.12 1.47 0.06  1.19 0.04 0.62 0.01 0.12 0.19 1.75 
D3  0.11 1.33 0.06  1.18 0.10 1.28 0.08 1.37 0.19 1.79 
D4  0.22 2.77 0.09  1.92 0.15 1.91 0.12 2.42 0.17 1.68 
D5  0.19 2.25 0.13  2.57 0.12 1.51 0.10 1.89 0.27 2.70 
D6  0.27 3.38 0.17  3.45 0.19 2.29 0.21 4.83 0.40 4.00 
D7  0.40 6.45 0.22  4.34 0.17 2.04 0.21 4.69 0.48 4.72 
D8  0.40 6.33 0.31  5.81 0.19 2.23 0.21 4.68 0.45 4.52 
D9  0.41 6.52 0.43  7.44 0.27 2.97 0.19 3.78 0.60 6.09 
D10  0.38 5.56 0.45  7.44 0.26 2.73 0.27 6.29 0.61 5.66 
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Figure A.2 Real price index of dwellings in old blocks of flats by quarter I/1970-
III/2007, 1970=100 (according to the Cost-of-living index) in Finland. 
 
   
 
Source: Statistics Finland (http://www.stat.fi/til/ashi/2007/03/ashi_2007_03_2007-10-
30_tie_001_en.html) 
 




Source: Global Property Guide (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/real-estate-house-
prices/F) 
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Figure A. 3 House price change and average price of residential properties in 13 
urban areas in Italy.  
 
   
Source: Global Property Guide (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/real-estate-house-
prices/I) 
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Source: Global Property Guide (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/real-estate-house-
prices/U) 
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Source: Global Property Guide (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/real-estate-house-
prices/U) 
 
Housing Price Index Series in the US 1987-2007. 
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Appendix B. Details of Table 5: 
 
Legal Rights Index  
 
measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of 
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index includes 7 aspects related to 
legal rights in collateral law and 3 aspects in bankruptcy law. A score of 1 is assigned for 
each of the following features of the laws:  
• General rather than specific description of assets is permitted in collateral agreements. 
• General rather than specific description of debt is permitted in collateral agreements. 
• Any legal or natural person may grant or take security in the property. 
• A unified registry operates that includes charges over movable property. 
• Secured creditors have priority outside of bankruptcy. 
• Secured creditors, rather than other parties such as government or workers, are paid first 
out of the proceeds from liquidating a bankrupt firm. 
• Secured creditors are able to seize their collateral when a debtor enters reorganization; 
there is no “automatic stay” or “asset freeze” imposed by the court. 
• Management does not stay during reorganization. An administrator is responsible for 
managing the business during reorganization. 
• Parties may agree on enforcement procedures by contract. 
• Creditors may both seize and sell collateral out of court without restriction. 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and 
bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit. 
   57
Credit Information Index 
measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility and quality of credit information 
available through either public or private credit registries. A score of 1 is assigned for 
each of the following 6 features of the credit information system: 
 
• Both positive (for example, amount of loan and on-time repayment pattern) and 
negative (for instance, number and amount of defaults, late payments, bankruptcies) 
credit information is distributed. 
• Data on both firms and individuals are distributed. 
• Data from retailers, trade creditors or utilities as well as financial institutions are 
distributed. 
• More than 2 years of historical data are distributed. 
• Data on loans above 1% of income per capita are distributed. 
• By law, borrowers have the right to access their data. 
 
The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit 
information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending 
decisions. 
 
Index of Mortgage Market Regulation 
 
The index score adds one point for fulfilling each of the following five criteria:  
•  Mortgage rate arrangements are primarily extended on the basis of fixed rate 
contracts. 
•  Mortgage equity withdrawal is absent or limited.   58
•  LTV ratio does not exceed 75 %. 
•  Valuation methods of property is based on historical values, rather than based on 
market values. 
•  Mortgage backed securitization is absent or limited. 
 
The index is then normalized to one. 
 